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The Role of Overlapping—Generations
Models in ionetary Economics
Abstract
The main arguments of this paper can be summarized as follows.(1)
The overlapping-generations (OG) structure provides a useful framework for
the analysis of macroeconomic issues involving intertemporal allocation.
(2) As a "model of money," the basic OG setup--which excludes cash-in-
advance or money-in-the-utility-function (MIUF) features--is inadequate and
misleading because it neglects the medium-of-exchange property that is the
distinguishing characteristic of money. (3) That this neglect obtains is
verified by noting that, in contrast with an axiomatic "traditional
presumption," the same aggregate leisure/consumption bundles are available
in equilibria in which "money" is valued and valueless. (4) That the model
may be misleading is demonstrated by examples in which three of its most
striking properties--tenuousness of monetary equilibrium, optimality of
zero money growth, and price level invariance to open-market exchanges--
disappear in the presence of modifications designed to reflect the medium-
of-exchange property. (5) There is no compelling reason why cash-in-
advance, MIUF, or other appendages should not be used in conjunction with
the OG framework.
Bennett T. McCallum




A substantial and soDhisticated body of research has grown up, over
the past few years, in which the overlapping-generations framework of
Samuelson (1958) has served as the analytical basis for models designed
to explain monetary phenomena. A far-from complete list of examples
might include papers by Bryant (1981), Bryant and Wallace (1979) (1980a),
Kareken and Wallace (1981), Martins (1980), Peled (1982), Sargent and
Wallace (1981), Wallace (1980) (1981), and Walsh (1982). In fact, the
profoundly influential analysis of Lucas (1972) falls into this category.
Proponents of the overlapping generations or "OG" approach have
argued vigorously not only that it is useful for monetary analysis, but
also that ocher existing approaches are highly unsatisfactory--see, for
example, Kareken and Wallace (1980), Bryant (1980), and Cass and Shell
(1980). In Wallace's words, the OG theory "includes what's essential for
a good theory of money, Economists should recognize it as the •best
available, and the Fed should not ignore its policy implications" (1977,
p. 2).
Other leading theorists have disputed these suggestions. Most prom-
inently, Tobin (1980) has expressed disbelief that nlthe overlapping
generations model is the key to the theory of money.7' Indeed, he suggests,
its analytical parable "should not be taken seriously as an explanation
of the existence of money in human society" (1980, p.33). More recently,
Hahn (1981, p. Il)hasremarked "how very bad these models are." Arid, of
course, crucial implications of prominent OG models conflict sharply with
those ofochertypes. For example, Wallace (1980) (1981) finds that the2
method of financing government deficits has no impact on subsequent
inflation rates, while Friedman (1974) and Barro (1981) suggest that the
method of finance is of central importance.
The purpose of the present paper is to examine the issues underlying
this controversy and develop tentative conclusions regarding the appro-
priate role of the OG framework in macro and monetary economics. We
begin in Section II with a discussion of some general features of OG
models and an exposition of two examples, both non-monetary in nature.
Then in Section III the basic monetary OG model, as described by Wallace
(1980),isdiscussed together with some important implications. The
extent to which this model reflects the medium-of-exchange role of
money is considered next, in Section IV, while related methodological
controversies are taken up in Section V. A brief discussion of some
more elaborate models is included in Section VI, and a conclusion
appears in Section VII.3
II. The Overlapping Generations Framework
The distinguishing characteristic of an OG model is that agents
in an everlasting economy have finite life spans of two or more periods.
These agents change as they age in the sense that behavior during youth
becomes sunk and choices are made with regard to consumption, leisure,
etc., in fewer remaining periods of life. Also, agents' endowments and
wealth may change as they grow older. At any point in time, then, the
economy includes agents of different ages who have different perspectives
on the accumulation of wealth, even if all agents are alike "before
birth"--if the lifetime utility functions and endowments are the same
for all generations. This feature provides a cogent rationale for some
kinds of economic activity that are hard to justify in other types of
models, without, that is, introducing the complication of agents that
are heterogeneous before birth. Thus OG models help to avoid analytical
difficulties that may be of no importance for various important topics
in monetary or macro economics. They do so, moreover, in a context in
which some agents--as yet unborn--cannot possibly meet in a marketplace
with those currently alive. This rules out certain types of exchanges
and thereby introduces an explicit and understandable "friction," some
type of which is widely considered to be necessary for providing a sound
foundation for the analysis of monetary phenomena.
In addition, OG models are typically characterized by the assumption
of perfect foresight or rational expectations, depending on whether the
analysis is deterministic or stochastic. While this characteristic is
not inevitable--one can imagine an OG model in which agents have static or
adaptive expectations--there seems to be something of a natural4
relationship: the motivation for models with the virtues described above
arises more clearly in the presence of the severe discipline imposed
by the assumption of rationality. In any event, perfect foresight or
rational expectations will be presumed throughout the following discussion.
A large fraction of the OG literature employs the assumption that
agents live for but two periods, with a new generation born each period.
Clearly, it is not possible to explain high-frequency empirical phenomena--
with a periodicity of (say) 10 years or less--with such models. They
can be used, nevertheless, to acquire understanding of various types of
dynamic behavior of macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, some quali-
tative properties of two-period OG models will carry over to versions in
which a larger number of phases of life are recognized. For most of the
issues discussed below, it does not matter how many periods an agent
lives, so for simplicity a two-period lifetime will be used in all that
follows.
At this point it should be useful to describe a sample OG model, so
as to fix some notation and provide a warmup for subsequent discussion.
Since the more controversial aspects of OG analysis concern monetary
applications, it will be best to begin with a model involving only real
magnitudes. A notable example is provided by the model of Diamond (1965),
a version of which we now describe.
Let c be consumption during period t(t =1,2,...)by a represen-
1/
tative young person and letx be consumption during tbyan old person.
When young, a person born in tseeksto maximize u(c,x1), where u(.,.)
is a utility function that yields unique differentiable demand functions
for c and It is assumed that c andx1 are normal goods and5
that the marginal rate of substitution u1/u2 approaches zero (infinity)
as c1/c2 approaches infinity (zero). This assures that positive
quantities ofc
arid will be chosen whenever possible. Each young
person is endowed with one unit of labor, each old person with none.
When old, a person's only object is to consume as much aspossible.
Production is carried out by oldpersons according to
(1) =
where n and are the labor employed and capital held in t by arepre-
sentative old person, withy the resulting output. The production
function f(.,.,) has positive but diminishingmarginal products, constant
returns to scale, and satisfies the Inada conditions(which assure that
positive quantities ofn and will be chosen). Capital, which is
stored output, depreciates at the rate 8.
In this setting, the consumption of an oldperson in period t is
(2) =f(nt,k)
—wn+
where is the real wage. Since the only choice variable is
labor is employed so that
(3) fi(n,k) -w
=0.
Given the degree-one homogeneity of f(.,.),then, f(n,k) =
r1f1(ri,k)+ktf2(ri ,k )sothat
(4) =ktf2(rlt,kt)+(l-)k.6




where is the competitive incerest rate on loansfrom ttot+1 and
where the left-hand side reflects the inelastic supply of one unit of





calculate first-order conditions,eliminate X, and obtain
(6) ui(c, x+i) =u,(c,x+i) [1 +
Demandfunctions for c and x1 are implied by (5) and (6); the former we
write as
(7) c =c(w,
Market equilibrium requires n =1(and also =l)so w and
are determined as functions of the predetermined variable k by relation-
ships (3) and (4). Equilibrium also requires that the rate of interest
satisfy
=2'k+i) —6




Thus ecuilibrium values of c, 'andk+1 are determined by (7), (8), and
(9), again as functions of the state variable kt. Given an initial per-
4/
capitastock of capital, k1, the model in principle defines time paths
for t=1,2,...for all of the system's variables.7
While the foregoing describes an extremely simple model, it has
some substantial analytical merits. Inparticular,it is an internally
consistent model in which optimizing agents make non-trivial inter-
temporal allocation (saving) decisions, in which expectations are
correct, and in which markets clear. Since utility and production
functions are clearly specified, it is in principle possible to use
the model to obtain answers to questions in welfare economics--
answers expressed, it should be emphasized, in terms of the utility of
5/
individual agents.
Before turning to monetary applications, let us briefly consider
6/
another simple model involving only real magnitudes. In
particular, consider the model of Calvo (1978), in which the second
factor of production is not capital but land: i.e., acommodity that
is non-augmentable, non-depreciable, and non-consumable, but which is
useful in production. Output, moreover, is nonstorable.
In this model preferences are as above and (2) again describes
production possibilities but with kt ao denoting the number of land
units held during t by a representative old person. The per-capita
stock of land is fixed at k (say), butk÷i is nevertheless a choice
variable to each individual young person in period t. Claims to land
parcels, which are transferred after production takes place, are
bought from old persons (who supply them inelastically) at the market-
determined (real) price Asbefore, old persons hire labor from
the young at the real wage ratew.
In this economy, consumption oftheold during t is
(10) x =f(n,k)
- +qtk8
Again is an old agent's only choice variable so (3) holds as before
and with constant returns to scale we have
(11) x, kt{f2(n,k) +
WithPt =f2(nt+i,1t÷i)taken parametrically as before, the
relevant Lagrangian expression for a young person is now
(12) L =u(c,xtl + X[wt -c
-x÷1qI(P
+




and the budget constraint is
(14) w -c
-x1/(÷1+ = 0.
These imply demand functions for ct and with those choices
dependent upon ' andthe expectation of
Market equilibrium in this model requires k =k+1
=kas well
as =n1
=1.Thus (3) and the definition of Pt imply thatw
and Pt are constants, say w and p. The other equilibrium condition
is that the per-capita supply of land, k, equals the demand, which
from (11) is
(15) kt+l =x÷1/(q1+p).9
Equations (13), (14), and (15) then determine c and x1 as
functions of Thus we write
(16) =
anequation that is analogous to the "pseudo reduced form" expresthions
7 /
thatappear in linear stochastic rational expectations models.
Such an equation need not be treated as an ordinary difference
equation in for is in fact the expectation formed at t of the
price of land that will obtain in t+l, an expectation that happens to
equal the realization only because of the absence of stochastic
elements in the present model. In other words, equation (16) does not
describe the market determination of÷1 given butinstead the
market determination of given the period-t expectation of
In light of this discussion, it is natural to look for a solution
expression that relates to the relevant state variables. The per-
capita stock of land in existence, kt, is a state variable just as in
the previous model but now its value is constant through time.
Consequently, the solution for is also a constant, say =q.
Accordingly, the expectation of equals -q also, and we evaluate
q in terms of the model's basic parameters by solving q =0(q).Under
our assumptions there will be a single solution to this equation.
Nevertheless, the solution path for q that we have just described
may not be unique: for some admissible u(.,.) and f(.,.) specifications
there will be time paths other than =q(t =1,2,...)that satisfy
(13)-(l5). Indeed, Calvo's development of this model was designed
to show that it is possible to have a multiplicity of rational10
expectations solutions in a non-monetary model with optimizing agents.
This multiplicity arises, however, because Calvo treats (16) as an
9/
ordinary difference equation.In McCallum (1981) it is argued at
length that such a treatment amounts to assuming that agents use
extraneous state variables in forming expectations of future values,
thereby inducing effects that occur only because they are arbitrarily
expected to occur. In a wide class of models, however, there is only
one solution that excludes such "bootstrap" or "bubble" effects. To
avoid the analytical paralysis that would result from the admission of
an infinity of solutions, therefore, itisoften desirable to focus
attentionon the single "minimal state variable" solution that is free
10/
of bootstrap effects.In the present case that happens to be the
stationary solution =qbut, in general, minimal-state-variable
solutionswill not be constants. Focussingattention on minimal-state-
variable solutions conforms to the practice and recommendation of
Wallace (1980, p.55), so it seems doubly appropriate for the discussion
iLl
ofmonetary OG models of the type championed by Wallace.Ii
III. The Basic Overlapping-Generations Model of Money
We now turn to the more controversial class of OG models, that
in which there is a non-productive and "intrinsically useless"
entity identified as fiat money. Since Neil Wallace has been an
influential leader in the development and application of such models,
we shall begin with an exposition of the basic setup in his 1980
paper. Substantively, this model is modified only by taking popu-
lation growth to be zero, but our notation will differ considerably
from Wallace's.
In this model, as in those of Section II, young persons endowed
with one unit of labor seek to maximize u(c,x÷i). Now, however,
labor is the only input to the productive process, which is
characterized by
(17) y =f(n).
Consequently, production will be effected by the young and there will
be no loss in proceeding as if their endowments were directly in the
form of output, in the amount y =f(l)units per young person. This
output is in general storable, but depreciates at the rate 6. More
specifically, y 1/(1 + 8) units are available in period t÷l for
each unit stored in t. By letting 6--, we can then represent a
completely perishable commodity. We permit negative values for 6,
reflecting autonomous reproduction of output, but require that
8 > -1.
Let k denote the amount of output stored in t by a representative
young person. Output neither consumed nor stored can be traded for12
money; the money price of a unit of output isP.Thereal quantity of
money held by a young person at the end of t is denoted
Oldpersons have zero endowments but each receives, in period t,
a lump-sum monetary transfer payment from the government of real
magnitude v. Consequently, each old person is able to purchaseoutput
in the amountv ÷ mt 1Pi/P in period t; per capita consumption by
the old is
(18) + v + miPi/P.
Given the present setup, the choice problem of a young person is
to select c, and m to maximize u(ct,x+1) subject to
(19)c+k+m =y
and to a version of (18) applicable to t+1. Our assumptions on
u(.,.) guarantee that c will be strictly positive, but non-negativity
constraints must be imposed for'
andnit. Consequently, the
first-order conditions obtained from the Lagrangian expression
(20) L =u(c,xi)i[y_c _k_m] + X2t[k + + -xtl]
are as follows:
(2la) ui(Ct,Xt+i) lt =0








m[ P/P-\1=0 t 2t ct÷l lt13
(21h)y_ct_k_maO
(21i) 'k +v1+ "+1 -x1
=0
These conditions imply demand functions forc, x1, and k in
which the arguments arev1 and In particular, conditions
(21) imply a per-capita demand function for money balances,
(22)
Market equilibrium in the model at hand requires that supplies
and demands are equated for money and goods, but by using Wairas'sLaw
we can express equilibrium in terms of the single condition
(23) m(v+i,P/P+1) Mt/Pt,
where Mt is the per-capita supply of money. Following Wallace,we
limit our attention to monetary policies of the form
(24) Mt =(l+.)Mt1 -l
withconstant. Then we can write
M÷1_M P.M Mt P
(25) v — — ____ t+1 t+l t÷l t Pt+l
and express the equilibrium condition as
/ M P P Mt
(26)m(r—; ) tt+1 t+l
The task of this equilibrium condition is to determine the
variable is (as described above) an expectation. The sole state14
variable is Mt so U is finite the minimal-state-variable solution
should be of the form
(27)
If we guess that this functionis of the form
(28) Pt =
withii a finite constant, then we find that the expectation is
(29) 't+i =M1
=T(l4)Mt
and the equilibrium condition becomes






Cancelling from the latter results in a single equation that
determines the value of IT as a function of .Consequently,we
verify the guess reflected in (28) and conclude that (28) in fact
17/
governs the behavior of P, when is finite, in the model at hand.
The possibility must be emphasized, however, that money will be
valueless in the model's equilibrium, i.e., that l/P =0for all t.
In this case we can nevertheless utilize the equations written above
if we define as equal to l-, an equality which also holds
when l/P > 0. Let us consider, then, what conditions lead to monetary
and non-monetary equilibria--i.e., to equilibria in whichmoney is
valuable and valueless, respectively, for all t =1,215
First, consider the case in which money-stock growth is slow
relative to physical depreciation; that is, in which p < 8. Then
X2/(l+ó) < X2/(l-) so (21f) implies that (21d) holds as a strict
inequality. Equation (21e) then requires kt =0;i.e., that no
storage take place. But in this case x1 can be positive only if
money has value, and our conditions on u(c,x+i) imply the existence
of a solution withx1 > 0--see Wallace (1980, pp.54-55).
13 /
Consequently,we see that a monetary equilibrium will prevail if< 8.
By contrast, when > 8, we have X2/(l+iS) > X2/(l-) so that
(2lf) is required by (21d) to hold as a strict inequality. Then
(21g) implies that m =0so that the equilibrium is one in which
money is not valued. More generally, if population grows steadily
at the rate v, money will be valueless whenever > V + V5•
Clearly, this "tenuousness" of monetary equilibria is an unusual
and striking feature of the OG model. In the case in which there is
no population growth or depreciation, the foregoing result implies
that money will be valueless if policy makes the money stock growth
rate any number greater than zero And even with growth and
depreciation taken into account, a money stock growth rate in excess
of (say) 107 per year would be predicted to result in a non-monetary
15!
equilibrium.
For many persons, a first reaction to this result might be, I
would guess, to conclude that the OG model is "obscenely at variance"
16/
with actual experience. Kareken and Wallace (1981) have emphasized,
however, that such results presume that all agents confidently
believe that the constant money growth policy will be maintained16
permanently. Furthermore, the result would be weakened by the intro-
duction of stochastic elements--see, e.g., Peled (1982). So it is
actually not a straightforward matter to bring evidence to bear on
the empirical validity of the basic OG model. Let us then continue to
explore its properties, reserving judgment for the moment on its
merits as a model of money.
Doing so, we find that other striking implications are readily
obtainable. Prominent in Wallace's (1980) discussion, in particular,
are several strong propositions concerning the efficiency--that is,
Pareto-optimality--of monetary and non-monetary equilibria.
Consider, for example, Wallace's Propositions 5 and 6. These pertain
to the case in which p < 8, so that the stationary equilibrium has
valued money, and assert that this monetary equilibrium is efficient
if .i<0 and inefficient if > 0.
To demonstrate the latter result, let us designate the equilib-
rium values of c, x1, and
:t a:
c, x, m and note that, since
k =0,c + x =y.These c ,xvalues refer to young persons
alive during each period of the economy's evolution, t =1,2
Also relevant to the Pareto-optimality criterion is the consumption
of the old during period 1, the initial period under con-
17/
sideratioti. Now, for each period t =1,2,...the feasible values
of c and x are those on or below the dotted line extending from
t t+1
=yto x1 =yin Figure 1. The budget line as seen by a young
person is, however, c =y+ (P÷i/P)(v÷1 -x+1).Thus choices
are made relative to a budget line with slope -(l--), such as the







bundlesc ,x with c < c and x>xthat are feasible and
-tt+l t t+l —
preferredby the young of each period to their chosen values,
* *
cand x .Furthermore,the old of period 1 would prefer a larger
value for x1, which is implied by c1 <cj', sothe equilibrium
c ,x•is not efficient,
If, by contrast, we had=0,the budget line faced by the
young would coincide with the socially-feasible tradeoff and the
equilibrium position would be optimal. And if p < 0 the budget line
would be less steep than the feasibility frontier so that feasible
** reallocationsaway from c ,xthat are desired by the young would
involve c >c*and x1 < x, which would diminish the utility of
the old in period 1.
The results of these last two paragraphs are not affected, it
should be added, by population growth:it is the aggregate, not
the per-capita, growth rate of money that is relevant. The slope
of the socially-feasible budget line differs from that perceived by
a young person when p differs from zero, not when the inflation rate
iof
differsfrom zero.
Thus monetary equilibria with positive money-stock growth rates
are socially inferior, in the OC model, to monetary equilibria with
constant or decreasing quantities of (nominal) money. But how do
the latter compare with non-monetary equilibria, in which money is
valueless and intertemporal consumption patterns differ from
*
endowmentsbecause of storage (k > 0)of the consumable commodity?
The basic answer is extremely simple: unless the commodity grows
while in storage (8 < 0), storage is inefficient. That is, barring19
6 <0,intertemporal reallocations away from endowment patterns can
be brought about by the use of money as a store of value. None of
the good needs to be kept in storage, so depreciation (if any) can
be avoided and a one-time increase in consumption effected. Thus
any non-monetary equilibrium with 6 > 0 is inefficient.
Taken together, these results suggest, as Wallace points out
(1980, p. 58), "that the quantity of fiat money should not be
increased. For [they] imply that if [<01,thenan optimal
monetary equilibrium exists whenever the nonmonetary (equilibrium]
is nonoptimal" (p. 58). This is, as Wallace emphasizes, a rather
drastic conclusion--one that contrasts sharply with the conduct of
monetary policy in most actual economics. The obvious question--
indeed, the main issue of this paper--is, then, whether it is
reasonable to use the OG model as a basis for reaching conclusions
regarding monetary issues.
In this regard, some critics might be inclined to reject the
OG model simply because it does not incorporate labor or product
market disequilibria; i.e., because it is an equilibrium model.
But that reason for rejection seems unwarranted. Whether pure,
flexible-price equilibrium models--as opposed to sticky-price
equilibrium models of the type mentioned by Lucas (1980a, 712,
n. 14)--will ultimately prove fruitful f or the analysis of
cyclical fluctuations and stabilization policy is at present
unclear. But even if flexible-price equilibrium models do not
prove adequate for cyclical issues, they may nevertheless provide
a useful basis for issues involving inflation, monetary growth
rates, etc. There are various issues in monetary economics that20
have traditionally been examined in full-employment models.
More serious, perhaps, is the question--mentioned by Kareken
and Wallace (1980, p. 8), Tobin (1980, p. 87), and many others--
of whether the analytical entity called "fiat money" functions in
the OG model as a medium of exchange. That this entity serves only
as a store of value is suggested both by the OG model's structure
and by the tenuousness property described above. To investigate
this issue is the next task on our agenda.21
IV. The Functions of Money
Let us begin the discussion by recalling that it has long been
agreed, by economists and laymen alike, that for something to be called
"money" it should function both as a store of value and as a medium of
19/
exchange. Indeed, as Wicksell (1935) observed, it is only the latter
2Q/
function that is distinctive;many assets serve as stores of value.
But the important issue is not, of course, terminological. It is, rather,
the entirely substantive matter of whether the OG model can provide
useful answers to questions regarding the behavior of actual economies
in which there is a medium of exchange.
To approach this issue let us first try to establish whether the
entity called fiat money does or does not serve as a medium of exchange
in the OG model. Now it might be thought that the answer to this question
is obvious; that one can simply look at the specification of the model
21'
and immediately see that there is rio medium of exchange.Lucas (1972,
p. 107) has suggested, however, that the matter is not so simple--
indeed, that the model is not rich enough to justify an answer one way
or the other. Presumably the idea is that the absence of an explicit
description of some activity is not enough to iriiply that this activity is
nonexistent in the modelled economy. A one-good model, for example, can
be given a many-good interpretation, as is done in Lucas's (l980b)
colored-marbles economy. That example, furthermore, shows that a one-
good economy can reasonably be thought of as possessing a medium of ex-
change, one that serves to facilitate transactions of types--say, among
the members of a single generation--that are invisible in the OG framework.22
This notion--that activities may exist even if not explicitly
described--may be accepted, however, withoutagreement that it is
impossibleto make progress on the issue at hand. What the notion
implies is that the approach must be indirect: instead of merely
looking at the model, w must look at its implications. If some can be
found that are inconsistent with the absence (or presence) of a medium
of exchange, then we can conclude that the model's money does (or does
not) function in that capacity.
Taking that approach, it appears that a reasonably satisfactory
argumentcan in fact be developed. This argument builds upon the
traditionalpresumption that an economywith a medium of exchange will
• 22'
bemore productive than it would be if no such medium existed.
More specifically, the presumption is that leisure-consumption possi-
bilities that would be unavailable under barter conditions become
feasible in the presence of a medium of exchange. The relevant cocnpari-
son, it should be noted, is one that holds constant (or corrects for)
the stock of capital: extra consumption or leisure resulting from a
larger capital stock does not reflect any medium-of-exchange effects.
For a given value of k, then, agents in the aggregate are able to enjoy
more leisure and/or consumption (without loss of the other) than would
be possible under barter. Given this condition, it becomes clear
that money in the basic OG model does not serve as a medium of exchange,
for precisely the same leisure-consumption totals are available in the
monetary and non-monetary equilibria when k is the same in each. This
is clearest in the no-storage case in which v= 0.Moregenerally,
consumption c+x equals y +(y-l)kregardless of the value of 'y.23
Correcting for the magnitude of k, then, c+x is the same inmonetary
and non-monetary equilibria. And to complete theargument, we note
that the entity called money certainly does not functionas a medium
of exchange in the latter type of equilibrium, for itsexchange value
is zero.
To the foregoing it might be objected by OG advocates that the
traditional presumption--that economies with a medium ofexchange are
more productive than without--has not been firmly establishedby
evidence or analysis. In response, it must be admitted that conclusive
direct evidence is not available: the experiment ofswitching abruptly
from barter to monetary exchange has probably not been performedon an
economy-wide basis. And it might even be granted that the analyses of the
presumption carried out by Bruriner and Meltzer (1971), Clower (1970),
and Neihans (1978, pp. 99-117) are not marked by formalrigor and
explicitness to the extent that is typical in the OG literature. But
it is difficult to believe that any reader of these three items-or, for
that matter, of Jevoris (1875) or Pigou (l949)--would doubt thevalidity
of the presumption. The objection seems to meunsustainable;
consequently, I contend that it is necessary to conclude that the OG
model's money does not serve as a medium of exchange.
Parenthetically, it might be noted that, while Wallace (1980) does
not mention the presumption,it is implicitly denied by his "confession"
that, to him, non-monetary equilibria and commodity-money equilibria "are
simply different names for the same thing." 1ore specifically, in models
with several equilibria in which =0,"there will in general be rio24
basis for classifying these into ...commoditymoney equilibria and
barter euiLibria' (1980, p. 52). Wallace attempts to justify this
position by suggesting that the main difference between commodity-
money and barter equilibria is in the differing patterns of transaction
velocities and conjecturing that 'most models with frictions are likely
to display some intermediate pattern" (p. 52). But while the pattern
of transaction velocities is directly and definitionally related to the
distinction under consideration, that does not rule out the possibility
of identification by means of implications for leisure—consumption
bundles (a possibility that may remain in settings in which transaction
velocities cannot be observed). Thus Wallace's denial of the presumption
seems unwarranted.
Next we turn to the question of whether it matters if the monetary
entity in OG models is riot a medium of exchange. But evidently it does
matter; some of the most striking properties of these models are cru-
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exchangefunction, for example, that accounts for the tenuousness of
monetary equilibria in the model of Section III. For if the model's
money served as a medium of exchange, it would provide its holders with
enhanced leisure-consumption possibilities by reducing transaction costs.
And this would induce agents to demand the asset even when its rate of
return is exceeded by that of other equally-riskless assets; thus
> 5 does not require =0.25
Inorder to demonstrate this particular claim, let us provisionally
adopt the artifice of making real balances P /p an argument of ttt
eachyoung perso&s utility function, which then becomes u(ct,xt+i,)
24,'
with u3 O. Given this modification to the model of Section III, the
first-order conditions (21) are replaced with the folloing:
(31a) ui(c,x+i,) -1t
=0
(31b) u (c ,x ,)-?.<0 2tt+lt 2t—
(31c) x [u (c -2t
=0 t+l2 t
(31d) 'y - <0
(3le) k f"( X2 — 0









tt+1 tt' -x=0 t+l t+1
Now in this case,>6implies 2/(1+5) > \2/(1+_) as before, but the
presence of u3(c,x+i,) > 0 in (31f) makes it possible for (31f) to
hold as an equality nevertheless. Thus m =0is not required by
.> 5;money may be valued when the money stock growth rate exceeds
the depreciation rate. In particular, money may be valued even though
> 0 and5 < 0.26
Theclaim of the last two paragraphs-- that tenuousness obtains in
the OG nodel because of the absence of the medium-of-exchange function--
has been disputed by Scheinkmaci (1980). In particular, Scheinkman
examines OG, cash-in-advance, and money-in-the-utility-function models,
and finds that 'the mathematical conditions that insure the absence of
tenuousness are very similar in all three classes of models" (1980,
25 /
p.91). The basis for this statement is Scheinkman.'s demonstration
that all three types of models may have solution paths along which
0 as t-*unless utility and production functions are such that
moneyis in some sense 'essential" or "necessary to the system"
(1980, p. 95). It is important to recognize, therefore, that these
equilibria in which 0 are quite different from the non-monetary
equilibriaemphasized by Wallace and described above. Specifically,
ci =0for all t=1,2,...in the latter, whilem > 0 for all finite t
inScheirikman's examples. In fact, examination indicates that the solu-
tion paths discussed by Scheirikman are bootstrap or bubble paths in
the sense defined in Section Il--paths along which effects arise only
because they are arbitrarily expected to arise. Those discussed by
Wallace, by contrast, are bubble-free, stationary paths along which
money is valueless in each period, Thus Wallace's tenuousness is much
more severe than the "asymptotic" variety considered by Scheirikman.
Consequently, the latter's examples shed no light on conditions
tending to bring about tenuousness of the relevant type.27
It is of course a matter of considerable interest whether Wallace's
optimality conclusions are also invalidated by changing the young
agents' utility function to u(ct,x, cnP/P1). In considering this
issue it seems appropriate, given our argument concerning tenuousness,
to interpret Wallace's Propositions 5 and 6 as being applicable when-
ever money is valuable, a less restrictive condition than <8.
Doing so, we find that the former proposition-—that any monetary
equilibrium is efficient if< 0--is not valid in the modified model.
This conclusion follows from consideration of a monetary equilibrium
in which storage is productive (8 < 0) andsatisfies 6 < .<0.
Starting from such an equilibrium, it is possible to increase the
stationary value of m without reducing c or x, since the relevant
physical constraint,
(32) y + (-l) k =c+ x,
does not involve m. Thus young agents' utility can be increased for
each t =1,2,...without any reduction inx1. Indeed, it is shown in
the Appendix that optimality of a monetary equilibrium with k > 0
requires= , justas in Friedman's (1969) essay on the "optimum
quantity of money."
It would obviously be possible to object to the reinterpretation
utilized in the last paragraph, but to do so would make thepropo-
sitions too model-specific to be of much interest. It seems more
likely that objections by OG theorists would focus upon the use of
a specification in which real money balances are treated as an
argument of agents' utility functions. We need, then, to address
the implied issue in some detail.28
V. Methodological Issues
It is no doubt widely known that most OG theorists object strenuously
to the use of money-in-the-utility-function or 'NITJF"models.In fact.,
the objection is shared by some monetary theorists who are not proponents
of the OG framework (e.g., Tobin (1980, p.86)); yet MIUF models continue
to be widely used. Let us consider why.
The rationale that users of MIUF models have in mind is presumably
26 /
somethinglike the following. Individuals do riot derive utility directly
from money balances; the only arguments of the direct utility function
pertain to consumption of commodities and leisure. Thus an individual
who lives for two periods (beginning with t) has a utility function such
as u(c,2,ci,2i). (Note that the notation is different from that
of previous sections.) But in order to obtain consumption goods, this
individual must acquire them in the marketplace--here a multigood inter-
pretatiort like that in Lucas (1980b) is helpful--arid shopping takes time.
Thus leisure in tisconstrained by
(33) =1-n
-s,
where n and are amounts of time spent working and shopping, measured
in units that make the total time endowment per period equal to 1.
Finally, shopping time per unit of consumption is constrained by a
technological relationship that reflects the transaction-facilitating
properties of the medium of exchange. Specifically, we assume
(34) St/ct
=29
with -<.<0 and 0 < '() < '(O) < ,wherem is t±e quantity of real
27/
money balances held at some point of time in period t.Thensub-
stitution readily yields
(35) ulc, c1, n÷1 -ct+i(mi/ci)j
=U(C ,fl ,m,C ,Z1 ,Lfl t t t t+lt+l t+l
and it is a function analogous to 'ri'thatappears in the MITJF models.
There are, of course, a number of issues concerning the specifi-
cation of 'i.Inaddition to the timing ambiguity mentioned in foot-
note 26, there is the question of why this transaction specification is
28/
not as in the cash-in-advance models.More fundamentally, Kareken and
Wallace (1980) have argued that such specifications involve implicit
theorizing, which makes it difficult or impossible to examine all aspects
of the model for logical consistency. Furthermore, the approach implies
a failure of the analysis to explainwhich physical objects are used as
the medium of exchange--something, they suggest, that should be determined
endogenously.
It is, I think, clear that the Kareken-Wallace criticisms of this
sort of approach have considerable merit. But there are several responses
that can be made. First, analogous criticisms are applicable to virtually
all of the "fundamental" relationships employed in neoclassical (and other)
economic theory. StRndard production-function specifications, for example,
are not actually dependent only upon the laws ofphysics.There is implicit
theorizing involved with the treatment of "capital services" and "tech-
29 /
nical progress," even at the purely theoretical level.And at the30
level of empirical application, the task of selecting a recorded time
series to represent "labor services' is not greatly different than when
the task is required for "money." Thus itappears that whole-hearted
adoption of the Kareken-Wallace principles would eliminate most existing
neoclassical analysis.Second, whatever their merits, the criticisms
do not provide much support for the basic OG specification.Specifically,
it is difficult to believe that the description of themedium-of-exchange
role of money provided by equation (34) could be more inaccurate than
one that requires this role to be nonexistent. To adopt the latter
condition would seem to be rather like erecting a theory of the firm
upon an assumption that makes output insensitive to the quantity of labor
services employed. In addition, one cannot explain what physicalobjects
serve as media of exchange by requiring that none do.
The upshot of this discussion seems to be that the use of MIUF models
31/
is not as unreasonable as some have suggested.But it should be kept in
mind that the underlying rationale is provided bysome sort of specifi-
cations like (33)-(35), and the implied properties of the indirectutility
function should be observed. Thus, for example,equations (33)-(35)
imply that /m =-(u/)'/c,which is inconsistent with an assump-
tion such as /m__.1. as 0.With (0) < ,theshopping-time
approach therefore implies that the medium of exchange may be abandoned
if its holding costs become too great. Also, a specification suchas
that used to obtain equation (31) can be justified only withsome very
special assumptions; more generally, one would expect labor time to enter
as an additional variable. More positively, the approach suggests that
agents can become satiated with finite magnitudes of cn.31
Now it should be cLear that the foregoing argument has nothing to do
with the essential generational structure of OG models; it concerns in-
stead the methodological predilections of some economists who happen to
be leading proponents of the OG framework. Thus there is no reason,
according to this argument, why OG models should not incorporate shopping-
time constraints such as (34)-(35) or even--if care is exercised--MItJF
specifications. Indeed, given the substantial merits of the OG structure
as a vehicle for the analysis of certain intertemporal issues, such a
combination seems attractive.
In fact, Helpman and Sadka (1979) have used a model of precisely
that type: an OG model in which young agents' utility depends upon cnn-
sumption while young and old, Labor while young, and real money balances
32/
carried into old age. A question that immediately arises, given the
foregoing discussion, is whether that particular specification is con-
sistent with the shopping-time approach. As it happens, an affirmative
answer can be obtained if it is specified that persons cannot supply
labor services (or that they are unproductive) when old. Then if each
person begins life without money, equation (35) will specialize to
(36) uLct, l-n-c(O),ct+1,
=u(c ,n ,c ,m ). tt t+lt+1
And since Helpman and Sadka make no explicit assumptions regarding
derivatives with respect tom+i they do not violate any properties
implied by u and .
Thismay be an appropriate point at which to consider, as suggested32
by Wallace (1980, p. 77), whether giving money a medium-of-exchange role
recuires abandonment of the idea that money is intrinsically useless.'
The answer to this question must depend, obviously, on precisely what is
meant by intrinsic uselessness. Presumably, it would require that money
not directly appear in any person's utility function. But what about
specifications like (33)-(35), which make money balances an argument of
indirect utility functions? It is my impression that most economists
would not consider such a specification as inconsistent with intrinsic
uselessness; even the store-of-value role can, after all, be utility—
enhancing. But if it were agreed that a proper definition makes intrinsic
uselessness inconsistent with a medium-of-exchange role for money, then
it has to be the former that is abandoned if one wishes to understand
the workings of a monetary economy.
It might also be said--perhaps unnecessarily-—that this paper's
disagreements with certain specific positions taken by Wallace should not
beinterrtd a a drtil ofth frtifrftiiroduot of hi work with —-- -— --——
monetaryOG models. In addition to its analytical results, this work
has usefully emphasized the needforinternalconsistency and reliance
upon policy-invariant relationships in macroeconomic modelling, as well as
the desirability of individual-utility-based policy analysis. Furthermore,
questions raisedby Wallace and his collaborators--e.g., why do government
bondsnot serve as a 'medium of exchange?--havedrawn attention to
importantissues.33
VI. Other Monetary OG Models
Thus far, our discussion of monetary issues has concentrated on the
basic model of Section III. It has, consequently, neglected some more
elaborate OG setups that have been developed and utilized in a number of
notable papers. A brief discussion of a few of these richer monetary
models will accordingly be presented in this section.
One of the more striking results in the OG literature is provided
by Wallace's (1980, pp. 71-73) (1981) "Modigliani-Miller theorem for open-
market operations," which suggests that changes in the money stock brought
about by open-market operations will have rio effect on the price level.
Analytically, an open-market operation is defined in these papers as a
33!
government purchase with money of some other asset, together with the
associated adjustments in (lump-sum) transfer payments that are needed
34/
to keep the path of government consumption unchanged.For such an
exchange to be of interest, it is of course necessary that both money and
the second asset be valued in equilibrium. Of necessity, then, the model
must be richer than that of Section III. In fact, the main discussion
in Wallace's cited papers utilizes a model that is quite similar to that
of Section III but in which the outcome of storage activity is stochastic.
Specifically, for each unit of output stored in period units are
available in period t+l, where t+1 is random and drawn from a stationary
distribution with mean greater than 1.0. Then with the aggregate money
stock held constant over time, risk-averse young agents will--for some 'y
distributions--wish to both hold money and store positive quantities of
output. The stochastic aspect of the model therefore makes it applicable34
to issues that cannot be addressed with the basic version.
In this model the government can also store output, subject to the
same stochastic technology, which it obtains in exchange for money.
Let k and k denote the per-capita quantities stored by young persons
and by the government at the end of period t. The formal counterpart
of an open—market operation is then a comparison of alternative
stationary equilibria in which the government stores different amounts
of output, with the quantities related by the condition dM =P
Here dM and refer to differences across equilibria, while P is the
price of output in the "initial" equilibrium.
The result that the same value of P is consistent with both equi-
libria may be explained as follows. Since interest earned on govern-
ment storage is returned to the private sector via transfer payments
(positive or negative), the ultimate constraints on c and x are the
same whether the government chooses a large or small value for
vided that this value does not exceed the quantity that young agents
,,.I
wouldchoose in the absence of government storage.Thus young agents'
choices for c and x will be the same for different settings of which
requires that total storage k + be invariant to k. But the young
agents' first-period budget constraint is y =c+m+k.Thus with c in-
variant to somust be m+k. Consequently, real balances m must be
directly related to unit-for-unit across steady states: dm =
Butthis is consistent with the open-market purchase condition
dM =P together with dP =0.So the same price level satisfies
equilibrium requirements in both steady states.35
The foregoing argument can be modified to show that the price-level
invariance result will riot obtain if real money balances provide trans-
action services. For in that sort of an economy, young agents care about
the nagnitude of m, as well as c and x. So these agents will not be in-
different to changes in m brought about by changes in aridwill
accordingly adjust their choices of c,x, and k. And that adjustment
process will prevent m from moving unit-for-unit with M and changes
in P will be required. In particular, m will tend to move less than M:
an increase in N will induce art increase in P.
Reflection upon the relative usefulness of assets in Wallace's model
makes his price-level invariance result less surprising than it seems at
first glance. Thus, the result can be restated more generally as follows:
an open-market exchange of a productive asset for an unproductive asset
will leave the relevant real quantity of the former unchanged, with the
real quantity of the latter adjusting as required. When stated in this
manner, the result becomes consistent with the predictions of "Ricardian"
models in which open-market operations in government bonds induce price
36/
level changes proportional to changes in the nominal money stock. To
see this note that in Ricardiart models money provides transaction services
and so is useful, while government bonds are--because agents take account
of associated future tax payments--of no consequence; useless. Thus the
Ricardian application is simple: the real quantity of the useful asset,
money, is unaffected by an open-market exchange for a useless asset.
Finally, note that our restatement of the result is also consistent with
the predictions of non-Ricardian models in which both money and bonds are
useful: the real quantities of both must then adjust in response to an36
open-market exchange.
A different way of providing room for two assets has been suggested
by Bryant and Wallace (1980b) and utilized (with modifications) by Sargent
arid Wallace (1981). In the models of these papers, the second asset is
interest-bearing government or private debt, i.e., bonds that are issued
only in large denominations. Young agents who are potential lenders are
of two types: ones with relatively large endowments (termed "rich") and
oneswith small endowments ("poor"). Rich lenders are obviously motivated
tohold bonds rather than money in order to obtain interest payments--there
is no other difference (except denomination of issue) in the two paper
assets. Poor lenders, however, can not hold bonds because each one's
endowmentis too small to permit the purchase of a single bond and it is
byassumption illegal for individuals to share ownership of a bond. Thus
there may exist (possibly deterministic) equilibria in which both bonds and
money are valued.
Without going into the details of the models in question, one can, I
think, conclude from the foregoing description and the discussion of
Section IV that "money" in these models does not serve as a medium of exchange.
Each of the paper assets functions as does "money" in the basic OG model;
both are valued in equilibrium only because of the rather arbitrary assumptions
that keep poor lenders from holding bonds. This conclusion is supported,
moreover, by application of the criterion proposed in Section IV--aggregate
consumption/leisure possibilities are not enhanced by the existence of
valued money.37
Next, let us consider an ambitious attempt by Peled (1982) to
generate, without resorting to a ?UP or cash-in-advance specification,
a more comprehensive role for money than exists in the basic OG structure.
In Peled's model, in which each young person has the same endowment of
a completely perishable consumption good and the same risk-averse utility
function, there are two spatially-separated islands to which are assigned
randomly-determined fractions of each new generation. In addition,
there is a second source of randomness: at the end of each period half
of the occupants of each island are selected at random and relocated
(with their money holdings) to the other island for the next period.
The agents thus selected will then spend their old age in a location
with conditions that, because of the random assignment of newly-born
persons, are different from those faced by their contemporaries who stay
on their island of birth. Since this selection process is random, there
is a certain type of risk that young agents on an island can (if they wish)
agree to share. They can do so by negotiating bilateral contracts
specifying money transfers that are contingent upon the second-period
population of the islands on which each party will spend his or her old
37/
age.
Consequently, Peled's model is one in which money serves to facili-
tate intragenerational communication, something that appears to be non-
existent in the basic OG model and its variants with random endowments
or storage processes. Under certain conditions the existence of money
therefore shifts outward the "utility possibility frontier;" if risk-
avoidance were a commodity it could be said that money makes feasible38
aggregate consumption bundles not available in its absence.Nevertheless,
it would appear that money still does not serve as a medium of exchange.
It is a transportable store of value which makes possible a type of
insurance contract, but there is no evidence that it serves to facilitate
39/
exchange of commodities.
Finally, let us consider Townsend's (1980) models in which money
serves to facilitate exchange among spatially-separated agents. In
particular, consider Townsend's version of the Cass-Yaari (1967) "circle"
model. This is not itself an overlapping-generations model, but is
related in the sense that it involves a highly-stylized setting in which
the role of money in facilitating certain desirable transactions is
40/
described with great explicitness.In Townsend's version, the model
features a countable infinity of infinite-lived agents, indexed by the
41/
integers, and a countable infinity of different perishable commodities.
In each period household i, which is endowed with a positive quantity of
good i only, is physically able to make contact only with households i-l
and i.+1.The tastes of household i are such that it obtains satisfaction
from consumption of goods i and i+l. Similarly, household i+l is endowed
only with good i+l and desires to consume goods. i+l and i+2, etc. Thus there
is no possibility of barter exchange, since there is no pair of agents
each of which has a commodity that the other values. In the absence of
money, each household simply consumes its own endowment. But if agents
hold positive quantities of fiat money--some physical entity that can be
stored and transferred costlessly--they can use these holdings to make
purchases of the second desired commodity. Townsend shows that a monetary
equilibrium exists in this setting and is Pareto superior to the nonmonetary,
autarkic equilibrium.39
Providing a full discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of this
model as a vehicle for monetary analysis is beyond the scope of thepresent
paper. A few comments are nevertheless in order. First, as Sargent (1982)
has noted, Townsend's models are somewhat less tractable than OG models.
Second, the type of exchange facilitation provided by money in the Cass-
Yaari-To'wnsend model is more extreme than in the traditional literature,
where the absence of a medium of exchange makes trades more costly rather
than impossible. As a result, the criterion of my Section IV wouldsuggest
that money does not serve as a medium of exchange in this model. But that
conclusion would not hold under a less extreme specification of transaction
costs. Indeed, it does not hold when the production technology described
by Cass and Yaari (1967, pp.364-365) is used instead of fixed endowments.
Third, the continued development of models emphasizing spatial separation
seems desirable.40
VII. Conclusion
The arguments of the present paper can be briefly summarized as
follows. The overlapping-generations structure provides an attractive
framework for the analysis of macroeconomic issues involving the inter-
temporal allocation of resources. The attractiveness of the OG frame-
work is a consequence of the essential generational feature that permits
an everlasting economy to be populated with agents who live for only a
limited number of periods. By assuming that agents are alike before birth,
one obtains a model in which it is possible to have a competitive equi-
librium that is time-stationary although the economy is populated at each
point of time with agents that are unalike with respect to wealth and
incentives to save. The stationarity facilitates analysis, while the
point-in-time heterogeneity of agents increases the types of economic
activity that can be considered.
As a "model of money,'t the basic OG structure--which excludes cash-
in-advance or money-in-the-utility-function (MIUF) appendages--seems
inadequate and potentially misleading, the reason being that it neglects
the medium-of-exchange property of money. That this type of model does,
in fact, neglect the medium-of-exchange property is argued in the following
way: an economy that possesses a medium of exchange can attain aggregate
2i
consumption/leisure bundles that would be unattainable in its absence;
in the basic OG model the same bundles are attainable (with a given
capital stock) in equilibria in which "money" is valuable and valueless;
hence this money does not serve as a medium of exchange. That the models
may be misleading is demonstrated by examples in which three of their most
striking properties--tenuousness of monetary equilibria, optimality of41
a constant money supply, and invariance of the price level to open-
market asset purchases--disappear in the presence of modifications
designed to reflect the medium-of-exchange property.
The paper also contends that, as the previous sentenceimplicitly
suggests, there is no particular reason why cash-in-advance, NIIJF, or
other appendages designed to reflect the medium-of-exchangeproperty
should not be used in conjunction with the OG framework.The useful-
ness of each potential appendage or elaboration isa distinct issue
that may involve difficult and importantmethodological considerations,
but in most cases these considerations havenothing to do with the
essential generational structure of OC models.APPENDD(
Inthe MIUF model of Section IV, conditions for Pareto optimality
of a stationary equilibrium can be obtainedby maximizing
u(c,x,) + (x1), whereis any positive constant arid (x1) is the
utility of theinitial old,subject to the constraints y+(y-l)kC -x0,
43/
+ -k-c-= 0,k ￿ 0, x1 ￿ 0, and 0.If and are the
44/
Lagrangiarimultipliers, the optimality couditlDns include the following:
(A-i)u1(c,x,) - = 0
(A-2)u2(c,x,) -Xi
0
(A-3)u3(c,x,) < 0, u3(c,x,)
=0
(A-4)e(x1)
- 0, x1[9(x1) -x21
0
(A-5) X1(y-l) —<0, k(X1(y—l) -X2]
=0.
Nowconsider a monetary equilibrium in which storage is positive, i.e.,
a case with > 0 and k > 0. From (A-3) we see that a satiation level of
money balances must be held, i.e., that u3(c,x,) =0.From (A-5) we
further see that X2 =1(y-l),which with (A-i) and (A-2) implies
(A-6)u1(c,x,) =u2(c,x,)+('y-l)u2(c,x,).
Butfrom equations (31g), (31a), and (31b)in Section IV we see that
agents'behavior implies
(A-7) (l4) u1(c,x,) =u2(c,x,)+u3(c,x,).
Thus with u3(c,x,) =0it is clear that (A-6) and (A-7) together require
=l/(l),which immediately reducesto -= 5.This is the Friedman-type
resultmentionedtoward the end of Section IV.REFERENCES
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1.Note that this notational convention differs from that typically found
in the OG literature, where t indexes generations rather than time.
2. With homogeneous young agents the loan market will be inactive but,
as in Diamond (1965), we assume that is taken parametrically never-
theless. In (5), and throughout the paper, inequality constraints are
written as equalities when they are certain to be binding in equilibrium.
3. Under the stated conditions, these will be necessary and sufficient
for optimality.
4. Here and in what follows, "per capita" refers to quantities per member
of the relevant generation, not per person alive.
5. Barro (1974) has shown the existence of an operative bequest motive will
under some conditions make an OG model analytically equivalent to one
with agents with infinite planning horizons. Drazen (1978) has described
one set of conditions under which this equivalence does not obtain.
In my opinion, there is ample reason to believe that the continued
development of both types of models--infinite-horizon and no-bequest
OG models--is appropriate. Barro's result is important but does not
warrant a dismissal of no-bequest OG models.
6. The reason for including this second example is to demonstrate that
multiple solutions may obtain in non-monetary OG models, thereby indi-
cating that solution multiplicities are not necessarily related to
monetary issues of interest.7. See, for example, Sargent and Wallace (1975, p.247).
8. See Calvo (1978, pp.322-324). These otherpaths are such that
as t—.°; they thus arise when Øt is large, making its
reciprocal less than 1.0.
9. When (16) is viewed as a difference equation, appears to be
a state variable relevant to the determination of or, equivalently,
as a state variable relevant to the determination of That
viewpoint suggests a solution of the form =Q(1)and substitution
into (16) gives Q(q1) which "verifies" the guess.
10. That this strategy is feasible is demonstrated in McCallum (1981).
It will be desirable if,asinthepresent case, the issues at hand
arenot directly concerned with the possible existence of bubbles.
11. Wallace's argument is compatible with, but less complete than, the one
in McCallum (1981). In particular, Wallace does notconsider the
possibilityof extraneous state variables other than timeand does not
offerany procedurefor selection of the appropriate solution in cases
inwhich the solution to undetermined-coefficient identities is not
unique.
12.There are, as in the Calvo model, other solution paths. We shall ignore
them, however, for the reasons given in Section II.
13. To be precise, the theory implies only that a monetary equilibrium will
exist--there is also an autarkic equilibrium in whichi/pt =0for all t.14. In the case in which ..= u,there is a continuum of equilibria in
which money is valued and goods are stored. Sinceand ô are
parameters of independent processes, I will devote no attention to
this borderline case.
15. Here 10% is simply an order-of-magnitude figure reflecting a
depreciation rate of about 0.06 and an output growth rate--resul-
tirig from population growth and technical progress--of about 0.04.
16.The phrase is taken from Sargent (1976).
17.Here period 1 is simply the point of reference for the optimality
calculation--a period within which a reallocation is contemplated.
If it is also the first period of the economy's existence, and
the latter begins without old persons, then < 0 is not optimal--
as consideration of the next paragraph in the text will reveal.
l8 In the case in which population grows at the rate v,theper-
capita notation employed above becomes inadequate for repre-
senting the transfer-payment injections of money. The slope
of an individual's budget line remains -+i/'whichnow
equals -(l.+.)/(1+\'), while the feasible values satisfy
=y
-
19. To quote Wicksell (1935, p. 6), "The conception of money is
involved in its functions ...:asa measure of value, as a
store of value, and as a medium of exchange ... ." Alsosee
Schumpeter (1954, pp. 62-63) and Jevons (1875).20. "Of the three main functions, only the last is in a true sense
characteristic of money" (Wicksell, 1935, pp. 6-7). According
to Schumpeter (1954, pp. 62-63), a similar view was held by
Aristotle. Also see Clover (1970, p. 14).
21.This seems to be the view of Hahn (1981) and Helpman and Sadka
(1979, p. 156).
22. See, for example, Clover (1970, pp. 8-14), Neihans (1978, p. 1-3),
and Pigou (1949, pp. 25-26).
23.Wallace's discussion on p. 52 is concerned with the relative
efficiency of fiat vs. commodity money, a concern that is
significant but entirely different. On p. 78, he denies or over-
looks the presumption in his assertion that "not a single proposi-
tion in monetary theory makes use of" the distinction between the
medium-of-exchange and store-of-value roles of money.
24.Whether there exists a reasonable justification for this procedure
is discussed below. Note that equations (31) also apply if the
real-balance term is defined as v1 +mP/P1. rJ L I..LIL
25. Scheinkman explicitly interprets his cash-in-advance model
as one in which money serves as a medium of exchange. To
represent that function of money is the usual reason for the
MIUF. assumption.
26. The development in this paragraph reflects influences from
a number of sources. These include Brock (1974), Dorribusch and
Frenkel (1973), DuttQn and Gramm (1973), Fischer (1974), ard Saving
(170). There are doubtless other relevant references; I have
listed only those that have had an influence on my own views.27.Most writers would probably specify real balances at the
start of period t. Some formulations in the literature
imply, however, that it is the end-of-period balances that
matter (Brock, 1975). Some average over the period is another
possibility.
28.One answer is that the cash-in-advance specification is a
special case, one with=0for m/c < 1 and=for
m/c .1.
29. Implicit theorizing must be involved, for example, in Wallacets
(1980) storage technology--especially in the case 6 < 0. Note that
this argument is more general than that of Jensen and Meckling (1979),
which hinges on a distinction between firms and other agents.
30. That does not imply that the principles are necessarily misguided,
but it does suggest that one proceed cautiously in embracing them.
31.Use for some problems, it should be added. Obviously such models
are not going to explain which objects serve as the medium of exchange.
32.Another example is provided by Weiss (198O.
33. Purchase quantities may of course be positive or negative for
individual operations.
34 These transfer-payment adjustments are, I believe, implicit in
traditional analyses of open-market operations. Their explicit
recognition is not the reason for Wallace's result.
35• Here and in what follows we drop the time subscripts since
steady-state equilibria are being discussed.36. For an example and references, see Barro (1981), Chapter 6.
37. Old persons' money will be more valuable on islands in whichthere
is a high ratio of young to old persons.
38. Compare the argument of Section IV.
39. This view is supported by application of the criterion of SectionIV,
conditional upon realizations of the random shocks. Details of the
timing or transactional assumptions of the model are alsoopen to
objection. In particular, newly-born young agents arrive before the
selected old agents are relocated--otherwise, how could their
number be known?--but trades with them are not permitted.
40. Sargent (1982) states that Townsend's models and OG models"embody
the same sort of impediment to private borrowing andlending which
provided a role for currency." (Townsend's Section 3 describes a
generalized OG setup; that will not be discussed here.)
41. Townsend's device of arranging agents in an infinitesequence rather
than a closed finite "circle," seems to me unconstructive. The
object of this device is to provide an "endogenous" exclusion of
private loans. But this exclusion results because of an analytical
condition--an infinity of agents at each point of time--thatmust
be literally untrue. If it matters whether one takes the numberof
agents to be infinite, asopposedto large and finite, then to do
so is inappropriate.
42.This "classical presumption" is taken to be axiomatic.
43.Itwould not affectthe following argument if we usedi(x1,1)
as
theutility of the initial old.
44. To avoid clutter, the discussion proceeds under the conditionx > 0.